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I. MINERAL SERVITUDES 
Louisiana does not recognize the concept of a mineral estate.1 The 
closest concept that Louisiana has is the "mineral servitude," a type of 
mineral right which is somewhat like a mineral estate, except that a 
mineral servitude automatically terminates through "prescription of 
nonuse" if the servitude is not used for any period of ten consecutive 
years.2 
A. Interruption of Prescription of Nonuse by Unit Operations 
In Petitjean II v. Samson Contour Energy E&P, LLC, servitude co­
owners fought over the right to receive a portion of the proceeds from 
a productive well that was drilled in 2006.3 The plaintiffs, along with 
other individuals, previously had been co-owners of certain land in 
indivision, including the land on which the productive well was drilled, 
but they had partitioned the land in 1993.4 In the act of partition, the 
co-owners reserved a single mineral servitude over the entire area, 
with each of them being a co-owner of the servitude. They also 
agreed in the partition that they would keep their mineral interests "in 
undivided ownership ... for the maximum allowable period of time. "5 
The parties' dispute over the rights to proceeds from the productive 
well turned on whether the servitude had terminated prior to 2006 
based on prescription of nonuse for the area where the well was 
drilled. Under the Louisiana Mineral Code, production or operations 
that occur on the servitude tract generally will interrupt prescription 
of nonuse as to the entire servitude.6 If a unit includes only a portion 
of a servitude tract, unit production or operations outside the servi­
tude will interrupt prescription, but only for the portion of the servi­
tude tract within the unit.7 Nevertheless, Louisiana Mineral Code 
article 75 allows parties to alter this default rule by agreeing "ex­
pressly and in writing" that any unit operations will interrupt prescrip­
tion as to the entire servitude. 8 
At the time the productive well was drilled in 2006, more than ten 
years had passed without any mineral production or operations occur­
ring on the servitude tract.9 Further, more than ten years had passed 
1. See Hodges v. Long-Bell Petroleum Co., 121 So. 2d 831, 836 (La. 1959); Long­
Bell Petr�leum Co. v. Tritico, 43 So. 2d 782, 791 (La. 1949); Indigo Minerals, L.L.C. v. 
Pardee Mmerals, L.L.C., 37 So. 3d 1122, 1127-28 (La. Ct. App.), writ denied, 46 So. 3d 
1274 (La. 2010). 
2. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 31:21-:23, :27 (2000). 
3. See Petitjean v. Samson Contour Energy E & P, LLC, 51 So. 3d 200, 201 (La. 
Ct. App. 2010), writ denied, 57 So. 3d 339 (La. 2011). 
4. Id. 
5. Id. 
6. See Lee v. Giauque, 97 So. 669, 670 (La. 1923). 
7. See �A. REv. STAT. ANN. § 31:33 (2000). 
8. See id. § 31:35. 
9. Petitjean, 51 So. 3d at 201. 
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without any unit production or operations for any unit that included 
the area where the productive well was drilled. But there had been 
unit operations during the prior ten years for units that included other 
portions of the servitude tract. 
Relying on the default rule that unit operations occurring outside 
the servitude tract will interrupt prescription only for the portion of 
the servitude within the unit, the defendants argued that servitude had 
terminated by prescription of nonuse as to the portion of the servitude 
tract where the productive well was now located. The plaintiffs, how­
ever, argued that the parties to the partition had altered the default 
rule by stating in the act of partition that they agreed to keep their 
mineral interests "in undivided ownership . .. for the maximum allow­
able period of time."10 The plaintiffs' reasoning was that altering the 
default rule to interrupt prescription as to the entire servitude would 
have the effect of keeping the parties' entire mineral interests in "un­
divided" ownership because the servitude was co-owned, whereas al­
lowing the servitude to terminate as to certain areas by prescription 
would result in the mineral interests reverting to individual ownership 
in those areas. 
The appellate court rejected the plaintiffs' argument. The Louisi­
ana Third Circuit stated that the parties to an act creating a mineral 
servitude need not expressly refer to Mineral Code article 75 in order 
to overrule the default rule regarding the interruption of prescription 
by unit operations, but they "must leave no question" that they in­
tended to agree that unit operations occurring outside the servitude 
tract would interrupt prescription as to the entire servitude if the unit 
overlapped the servitude.11 Although an interruption of prescription 
as to the entire servitude would have the effect of keeping the entirety 
of the mineral interests "in undivided ownership" for the maximum 
time, the language of the act creating the servitude did not clearly 
demonstrate an intent to alter the default rule regarding interruption 
of prescription by unit operations.12 
B. Creation of Servitudes-One or Several? 
The parties disputed ownership of the royalty proceeds from a cer­
tain well, with the ownership question turning on whether prior trans­
actions had created a single servitude or multiple servitudes.13 The 
competing claimants were the landowner and the Mikell Group, 
which consisted of several persons who claimed to be owners of a sin­
gle mineral servitude. The Mikell Group claimed that a single servi­
tude had been created over several contiguous tracts by an act of 
10. Id. at 203. 
11. See id. 
12. See id. 
13. Neumin Prod. Co. v. Tiger Bend, Ltd., 58 So. 3d 1088, 1090 (La. Ct. App.), writ 
denied, 63 So. 3d 984 (La. 2011). 
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partition and exchange in 1983. Further, they claimed that the servi­
tude had been kept alive by mineral activity on one of the tracts cov­
ered by the alleged single servitude, though the activity was not on the 
tract that now had a productive well. 
The landowner sought summary judgment, arguing multiple servi­
tudes had been created and that the particular servitude that included 
the well's location had been extinguished by ten years prescription of 
nonuse.14 The trial court granted the landowner's motion for sum­
mary judgment. The appellate court affirmed. The appellate court 
noted that the 1983 transaction had involved several tracts of land 
owned by different individuals. The court concluded that the individ­
uals had made mineral reservations prior to combining the land for 
partition, and therefore they must have intended that each of them 
would reserve the minerals he owned prior to the partition.15 Thus, 
they had created multiple servitudes. The court concluded that the 
servitude for the area that now contained a productive well had termi­
nated based on prescription of nonuse. 
II. LEASE INTERPRETATION DISPUTES 
A. Most-Favored-Nations Clause 
Hoover Tree granted a mineral lease to Goodrich covering 317 
acres in Caddo Parish. The lease specified a $1,000 per acre bonus, a 
25% royalty, and that Goodrich would be bound by a most-favored­
nations clause ("MFN").16 The MFN provided that if Goodrich or its 
"successors and assigns" paid a higher bonus or royalty to any other 
lessor within a specified area during the primary term of Hoover 
Tree's lease, Hoover Tree would be paid the difference. 
Goodrich subsequently transferred a one-half interest in the lease 
to Chesapeake as to depths below the Cotton Valley Formation.17 
Goodrich did not retain an overriding royalty on the transferred inter­
est. Hoover Tree learned that Chesapeake had paid bonuses as high 
as $25,000 per acre and royalties as high as 30% within the specified 
area during the primary term of the Hoover Tree lease.18 Relying on 
the MFN clause and an argument that Chesapeake was Goodrich's 
"assign," Hoover Tree filed suit against Goodrich, Chesapeake, and 
others, seeking a higher royalty and higher bonus. 
The district court granted judgment for Hoover Tree, increasing its 
royalty to 30% and awarding it more than $7.6 million, the difference 
between a bonus of $1000 per acre and a bonus of $25,000 per acre for 
14. Id. 
15. Id. at 1093. 
. 16. Hoover Tree Farm, L.L.C. v. Goodrich Petroleum Co., 63 So. 3d 159, 161-62 (La. Ct. App.), writ denied, 69 So. 3d 1161 (La. 2011). 
17. Id. at 160. 
18. Id. at 162. 
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317 acres.19 The defendants appealed, arguing that the transfer to 
Chesapeake was a sublease, not an assignment. and therefore that 
Chesapeake was neither a "successor" nor an "assign." The appellate 
court rejected the defendants' arguments and affirmed, holding that 
Goodrich's transfer of an undivided interest in the deep formations. 
without reservation of an overriding royalty, constituted an assign­
ment. Therefore, the MFN applied.20 The appellate court held that 
both Chesapeake and Goodrich were liable for the higher royalty and 
bonus because the Louisiana Mineral Code makes an assignee directly 
liable for lease obligations.21 
B. Continuous Drilling Operations 
H & K Limited's predecessor-in-interest granted a mineral lease to 
Martin Producing, which later assigned the lease to Chesapeake.22 
The lease provided that it would remain in effect for a primary term of 
three years and as long thereafter as minerals were produced in pay­
ing quantities. The lease also had a continuous drilling operations 
clause which provided that if there was not production at the end of 
the primary term, but the lessee was conducting drilling operations, 
the lease would continue in effect so long as the lessee continued drill­
ing operations or produced minerals in paying quantities without a 
break of more than ninety consecutive days. At the end of the pri­
mary term, Chesapeake was not producing minerals from the leased 
premises, but it had begun drilling operations. Chesapeake continued 
such operations without any cessation exceeding ninety days and put 
the well into production. H & K brought suit for a judgment that the 
lease had terminated, but the district court granted summary judg­
ment in favor of Martin and Chesapeake, holding that plain language 
of the continuous drilling operations clause meant that the lease had 
been maintained.23 The appellate court affirmed. 
C. Granting Clause in Louisiana Bath Form Lease 
In Alyce Gaines Johnson Special Trust v. El Paso E & P Co., the 
parties disputed the meaning of a clause in a standard form lease-a 
Louisiana Bath form 14-BRI-24-that granted rights "exclusively 
unto lessee for the purpose of ... exploring ... and producing oil, gas, 
and all other minerals" from the leased premises.24 The lessor sought 
a declaratory judgment that the lease did not apply to the Haynesville 
19. Id. at 160. 
20. Id. at 180-81. 
21. Id. 
22. H & K Ltd. of La. v. Martin Producing, L.L.C., 70 So. 3d 847, 847-48 (La. Ct. 
App. 2011). 
23. Id. at 850-51. 
24. Alyce Gaines Johnson Special Trust v. El Paso E & P Co., 773 F. Supp. 2d 640, 
641-42 (W.D. La.), aff'd, 438 F. App'x 340 (5th Cir. 2011). 
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Shale which is found at a depth of about 10,400 feet. The plaintiffs 
assert
,
ed that no wells in the area had ever been drilled to a depth 
greater than 7,500 feet at the time the lea�e .was granted in 1950, and that the parties had not contemplated dn�lmg to depths as grea� as 
10 400 feet at the time when the lease was signed. The defendant filed 
a �otion to dismiss. The court initially denied the motion to dismiss, 
but on reconsideration, the court granted the motion to dismiss, hold­
ing that the lease unambiguously granted to the lessee the right to 
explore and drill to all depths.25 
D. "Calculate and Pay" Clause 
The Deep Water Royalty Relief Act ("DWRRA") provides incen­
tives for deepwater drilling on federal lease tracts sold in certain areas 
of the Gulf of Mexico between 1996 and 2000.26 For example, section 
304 provides that lessees will not owe royalties on the first 87.5 million 
barrels of oil equivalent ("BOE") produced from water depths greater 
than 800 meters. Lesser amounts of royalty relief are granted for 
wells located at depths greater than 200 meters, but less than 800 
meters. 
In 1999, a lessee granted overriding royalty interests to several indi­
viduals for a well that qualified for 87.5 million BOE of royalty relief 
under section 304.27 The agreements granting the overrides stated 
that the overrides would be "payable out of all oil, gas, casinghead gas 
and associated substances produced," but also provided that "[t]he 
overriding royalty interest assigned . . . shall be calculated and paid in 
the same manner and subject to the same terms and conditions as the 
landowner's royalty under the Lease. "28 The latter provision is a "Cal­
culate and Pay" clause. 
Statoil and Total owned fractional working interests in the lease. 
They filed motions for a summary judgment that they did not have to 
pay overriding royalties until the well produced 87.5 BOE because 
that is how the lessor's royalty would be "calculated and paid."29 One 
of the override owners opposed the motions, arguing that the override 
royalties were owed on all production, and that the lessees' override 
obligations were not affected by DWRRA.30 The court granted the 
motion for summary judgment, holding that the obligation to pay 
overriding royalties did not begin until there was an obligation to pay 
royalties to the lessor. 
25. Id. at 646-47. 
26. See Outer Continental Shelf Deep Water Royalty Relief Act, Pub. L. No. 104-
58, § 304, 109 Stat. 563. 565-66 (1995) (not codified but contained in a note to 43 
u.s.c. § 1337 (2006)). 
27. Total E & P USA, Inc. v. Kerr-McGee Oil & Gas Corp., Nos. 09-6644, 10-
0106, 2010 WL 5207591, *1-2 (E.D. La. 2010). 
28. Id. at *2 (emphasis added ). 
29. Id. at *3. 
30. Id. at *4. 
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III. OTHER LEASE DISPUTES 
A. Error as a Basis to Vitiate Consent 
517 
In Cascio v. Twin Cities Development, the plaintiffs were individuals 
who had granted a mineral lease covering seventy-six acres in Bossier 
Parish in April 2008.31 Six months after granting the lease, the pla�n­
tiffs filed suit seeking to rescind the lease based on error. The plam­
tiffs alleged that the Haynesville Shale extended beneath the leased 
premises, and that they had not known this when they signed the 
lease, but that the lessee had known. The plaintiffs argued that these 
facts were a sufficient basis to rescind the lease based on error. The 
district court, however, granted summary judgment in favor of the de­
fendant, and the plaintiffs appealed. 32 
The Louisiana Second Circuit Court of Appeal noted that mineral 
leases are governed by the Louisiana Mineral Code,33 as well as the 
general principles of contract law provided by the Louisiana Civil 
Code.34 The Civil Code provides that contracts require the consent of 
the parties,35 and that "consent may be vitiated by error,"36 but error 
vitiates consent only if: (1) the error concerns a reason without which 
the party would not have entered the contract, and the reason was 
known to the other party;37 or (2) the error concerned the nature of 
the contract, the thing that is the object of the contract, or a substan­
tial quality of the thing.38 
The plaintiffs argued that the object of the contract was the land 
and its mineral formations, and their lack of knowledge about an ex­
ceptional quality of the land-the presence of the Haynesville Shale­
was an error that vitiated consent. But the Second Circuit rejected 
that argument, stating that mineral exploration is inherently specula­
tive.39 Accordingly, "[t]he inherent nature and character of the right 
to extract oil and gas from the soil is such as not to be susceptible of 
having an intrinsic, determinable, and fixable value. "40 Given the 
speculative nature of mineral exploration, and that "both the plaintiffs 
and the defendants could speculate as to the existence and value of 
minerals" beneath the leased premises, the plaintiffs' alleged "error" 
was not the sort that would vitiate consent.41 
31. Cascio v. Twin Cities Dev., 48 So. 3d 341, 342 (La. Ct. App. 2010). 
32. Id. 
33. Id.; see LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 31:1 (2000). 
34. Cascio, 48 So. 3d at 342-43. 
35. Id. at 343 (citing LA. Crv. CODE ANN. art. 1927 (2008)). 
36. Id. (citing LA. Crv. CoDE ANN. art. 1948 (2008)). 
37. Id. (citing LA. Crv. CooE ANN. art. 1949 (2008)). 
38. Id. (citing LA. Ctv. CODE ANN. art. 1950 (2008)). 
39. Id. at 344. 
40. Id. (quoting Wilkins v. Nelson, 99 So. 607 609 (La. 1924)) 
41. Id. 
' . 
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B. The Suspension Doctrine 
[Vol. 18 
The Ferraras granted a mineral lease covering a forty-eight-acre 
tract in DeSoto Parish in 1988.42 The lessee drilled two wells on lands 
unitized with the leased premises-one in 1988 and another in 1989. 
Both wells were productive and still were producing at the time of 
trial. The lessee also drilled a dry hole on the leased premises in 1990. 
Questar, which had been assigned the lessee's rights, drilled a well on 
land unitized with the leased land in 2000. The well was productive 
and remained in production at the time of trial. But the lessors sued 
for lease cancellation, asserting that the lessee had not adequately de­
veloped deeper formations, such as the Haynesville Shale. The plain­
tiffs filed their suit about five months after Chesapeake made an 
announcement about the Haynesville Shale's potential and one week 
after the Louisiana Office of Conservation had made an 
announcement. 
After a bench trial, the district court granted cancellation of the 
lease as to all depths deeper than the Hosston formation.43 On ap­
peal, Questar argued that the district court had erred by allowing the 
Ferraras to introduce evidence of Questar's and other companies' 
drilling of Haynesville Shale wells on other properties subsequent to 
the Ferraras filing suit. Questar argued that such evidence was not 
relevant because both an express clause in the lease and the jurispru­
dential "suspension doctrine" provided that a lessee's duties to ex­
plore and develop are suspended during litigation in which a lessor 
challenges the validity of a lease. 
But a three-judge panel of the Louisiana Second Circuit disagreed, 
concluding that the jurisprudential suspension doctrine applies to ser­
vitudes, not leases.44 The panel concluded that the express lease 
clause did not apply because the lessors did not challenge the validity 
of the lease. Rather, they recognized the lease as valid and simply 
sued for lease cancellation. The court agreed with Questar that post­
lawsuit conduct could not prove whether someone breached a duty to 
explore prior to suit being filed, but held that the trial court did not 
err in considering post-lawsuit conduct as circumstantial evidence of 
Questar's intent prior to suit being filed. 
Nevertheless, the three-judge panel reversed. They stated that lease 
cancellation is a harsh remedy, and that the Ferraras had not 
presented any expert testimony that a reasonably prudent operator 
�ould have drilled a well to the Haynesville formation prior to the 
time the Ferraras made demand or filed suit.45 In the absence of such 
testimony, the mere fact that Questar had not drilled a Haynesville 
42. Ferrara v. Questar Exploration & Prod. Co. 70 So. 3d 974 977 (La. Ct. App. 
2011). , ' 
43. Id. at 979. 
44. Id. at 981. 
45. Id. at 983-84. 
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Shale well on the leased premises within five months of Chesapeake's 
announcement and one week of the Commissioner's announcement 
was not sufficient to support a finding that Questar had breached its 
duty of further exploration. 
A five-judge Second Circuit panel that included Judge Caraway 
considered a request for rehearing, and denied rehearing.46 Judge 
Caraway, who was not on the three-judge panel, wrote an opinion 
concurring in the denial of rehearing and declaring that he agreed 
with the result below, but he disagreed with the original panel's state­
ment that the "suspension doctrine" does not apply to leases. Judge 
Caraway wrote that the original panel's statement is inconsistent with 
Louisiana Supreme Court jurisprudence.47 Judge Caraway stated that 
a lessor's erroneous suit for lease cancellation breaches the warranty 
of peaceful possession and justifies a suspension of the duty to de­
velop. Two other judges joined Judge Caraway's concurring 
opinion.48 
C. Pre-suit Notice of Royalty Claims in Putative Class Action 
Mineral Code article 137 requires a lessor to give written notice to a 
lessee thirty days prior to filing claims based on the nonpayment, un­
derpayment, or untimely payment of royalties.49 In Williams v. Chesa­
peake Louisiana, Inc., a plaintiff brought a putative class action for 
allegedly unpaid royalties.50 The district court adhered to existing 
United States Fifth Circuit jurisprudence by holding that the required 
notice cannot be given by one person on behalf of a putative class.51 
The court rejected plaintiff's argument that the notice requirement 
does not apply if a plaintiff seeks unpaid royalties, but not "damages." 
D. Judicial Control Doctrine 
Several members of the Walker family granted mineral leases to 
Chesapeake Louisiana, L.P. for land in Caddo Parish.52 The Walkers 
brought suit the following year, alleging that Chesapeake had 
breached three provisions in the leases. The sole relief sought by the 
Walkers was lease cancellation.53 
One of the three lease clauses allegedly breached by Chesapeake 
prohibited the company from using the surface of the leased premises 
46. Id. at 985. 
47. Id. at 987. 
48. Id. 
49. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:137 (2000). 
50. Williams v. Chesapeake La., Inc., No. 10-1906, 2011 WL 1868750, at *l (W.D. 
La. May 13, 2011 ). 
51. Id. at *3 (following Chevron USA, Inc. v. Vermilion Parish Sch. Bd., 377 F.3d 
459, 461 (5th Cir. 2004)). 
52. Walker v. Chesapeake La., Ltd. P'ship, 440 Fed. App'x 254, 255 (5th Cir. 
2011). 
53. Id. 
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without the Walkers' consent. The Walkers alleged that Chesapeake 
violated the clause by crossing the leased premises in all terrain vehi­
cles without permission and by staking the location of a future well 
site on the leased premises without permission. It was undisputed that 
these alleged actions did not cause any physical damages. 
A second clause allegedly breached by Chesapeake required the 
company to share certain well data with the Walkers, pursuant to a 
"data license agreement" to which the parties would mutually agree.54 
The undisputed facts showed that the parties had never agreed to a 
data license agreement, and that Chesapeake had not shared the re­
quired well data with the Walkers, but that Chesapeake had contacted 
the Walkers in an attempt to negotiate a data license agreement the 
day after the Walkers notified Chesapeake of its alleged breach of the 
duty to share well data. 
The third clause allegedly breached by Chesapeake states that if 
"Lessee acquires seismic permits on lands within one mile of the 
Leased Premises, Lessee agrees to negotiate in good faith to include 
both the Leased Premises and surrounding acreage so as to ade­
quately provide fully imaged 3-D seismic coverage of the Leased 
Premises."55 The parties disputed whether Chesapeake's duty under 
this clause was triggered by Chesapeake merely acquiring seismic per­
mits, as the Walkers contended, or whether the duty arose only if 
Chesapeake actually conducted seismic testing within one mile. 
In support of their request for lease cancellation, the Walkers relied 
on Louisiana Civil Code article 2013, which states: "When the obliger 
fails to perform, the lessee has a right to the judicial cancellation of 
the contract .... "56 The Walkers argued that article 2013 provided 
them an unconditional right to lease cancellation if they proved a 
breach by Chesapeake. Chesapeake argued otherwise, contending 
that the doctrine of "judicial control" gives courts the discretion to 
decide whether to terminate a contract or award a lesser remedy in 
the event of a breach. 
Chesapeake sought summary judgment on two grounds: (1) it had 
substantially performed; and (2) under the doctrine of "judicial con­
trol," the district court need not terminate the leases, even if Chesa­
peake had breached the leases, and under the facts of this case the 
court should not terminate the leases.57 The district court concluded 
that an issue of fact precluded a summary judgment based on Chesa­
peake's contention that it had substantially performed its obligations. 
But the court granted summary judgment on the basis of judicial con­
trol, and dismissed the Walkers' claims. 
54. Id. at 257-58. 
55. Id. at 258. 
56. Id. at 256. 
57. Id. at 255. 
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On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
rejected the Walkers' argument that article 2013 requires lease termi­
nation in the event of a breach. The court noted that Louisiana courts 
have sometimes declined to award lease cancellation, and that article 
2013 should be interpreted as giving a party a right to seek judicial 
dissolution of a contract, while leaving the court with discretion 
whether to grant that remedy. 
Turning to the standard for contract dissolution, the Fifth Circuit 
noted that Louisiana jurisprudence does not favor lease cancellation. 
The court determined that a "dereliction of duty must be of a substan­
tial nature and cause injury to the lessor" in order for lease dissolution 
to be warranted.58 The Fifth Circuit stated that the decision whether 
to exercise "judicial control" to avoid lease termination is a decision 
for the judge, not a jury, that appellate review of a decision to exercise 
judicial control is based on an abuse of discretion standard, and that 
summary judgment is appropriate if the judge determines that judicial 
control should be exercised even under the version of "the facts most 
favorable to the non-moving party that could be found by a jury. "59 
Applying these standards, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's 
grant of summary judgment, holding that the court had not abused its 
discretion by declining to terminate the leases. 
IV. RECORDATION ISSUES 
A. Notices of Lease 
Effective January 1, 2011, Louisiana Revised Statute 44:104 was 
moved to Louisiana Revised Statutes Title 9, known as the Civil Code 
ancillaries, and was redesignated as 9:2742.60 Among other things, the 
statute specifies that recordation of a notice of lease will be given the 
same effect as recordation of the lease itself. 
B. Unrecorded Exercise of Option to Extend Lease 
Claude and Linda Sparks purchased several acres in Caddo Par­
ish.61 The parties to the sale had agreed that the sellers would reserve 
25% of the minerals, but the parties signed an act of sale that errone­
ously stated that the sellers reserved 75%. Some time later, XTO of­
fered to lease a 75% mineral interest from the Sparks for $20,000 per 
acre, but XTO withdrew the offer after discovering that the Sparks 
seemed to own only 25 % of the minerals. An act of correction was 
recorded to reflect that the sellers had reserved only 25% of the min-
SS. Id. at 256. 
S9. Id. 
60. H.B. 857, 2010 Leg., Reg. Sess., 2010 La. Acts 284. 
61. Stt Sparks v. United Title & Abstract, L.L.C., 56 So. 3d 302, 303 (La. Ct. App. 2010), writ dtnkd, 57 So. 3d 337 (La. 2011). 
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erals, but, by that time, XTO was no longer interested in leasing the 
property. 
The Sparks brought suit against their title insurance company, 
which had prepared the erroneous act of sale. The company moved 
for summary judgment, noting that the Sparks' land was subject to a 
previously recorded lease to St. Mary Land & Exploration. That 
lease's three-year primary term had expired (and apparently the lease 
had not been maintained by production), but the lease contained an 
option for a two-year extension, which St. Mary had exercised. The 
title insurance company argued that the Sparks were not damaged by 
XTO's withdrawal of its lease offer because the pre-existing lease to 
St. Mary precluded the Sparks from granting a valid lease to XTO. 
The Sparks argued that they were not bound by St. Mary's unre­
corded exercise of its option to renew.62 The trial court disagreed, 
holding that, under the Louisiana public records doctrine, a third 
party is bound by an unrecorded exercise of an option to renew a 
lease if the lease containing the option is recorded. The Louisiana 
Second Circuit affirmed. 
C. New Record Leaseholder Was Necessary Party in 
Action to Rescind Trans/ er 
Morgan held the rights of lessee under several mineral leases, but 
he assigned those rights to Winbeau Oil & Gas.63 Morgan later 
brought suit to rescind the assignment, alleging that he had assigned 
his rights based on false representations by an agent of Winbeau. In 
the meantime, however, Winbeau had reassigned the leases to Pe­
trohawk. The trial court rendered a judgment rescinding the assign­
ment, but the appellate court reversed and remanded, holding that 
Petrohawk, the record leaseholder, was a necessary party under Loui­
siana Code of Civil Procedure article 641. 
V. LIENS 
A. Validity of Lien Under Louisiana Oil Well Lien Act 
Cutting Underwater Technologies USA, Inc. v. Con-Dive, LLC 
concerned a dispute that arose after Hurricane Rita toppled a plat­
form associated with a lessee's inactive well on the outer continental 
shelf.64 The lessee hired a contractor that removed the platform, but 
failed to pay its subcontractors. The subcontractors responded by 
placing liens on the lessee's property, pursuant to the Louisiana Oil 
62. Id. at 304. 
63. See Morgan v. Winbeau Oil & Gas Co., 57 So. 3d 1202, 1203-04 (La. Ct. App. 
2011). 
64. Cutting Underwater Techs. USA, Inc. v. Con-Dive, LLC, No. 09-387, 2011 WL 
1103679, at *1 (E.D. La. Mar. 22, 2011). 
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Well Lien Act65 ("LOWLA"), which applied as surrogate federal law 
under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act66 ("OCSLA").67 
LOWLA protects those who provide work for "operations" per­
formed at the "well site" of an oil or gas well.68 "Operations" include 
"drilling, completing, testing, producing, reworking, or abandoning a 
well." The lessee challenged the validity of the liens on two bases. 
First, the lessee argued that removal of the platform was not part of 
"abandoning a well. "69 The lessee had plugged the well and cut its 
casing prior to Hurricane Rita. The lessee argued that those prior 
steps had completed the abandonment. The court disagreed, conclud­
ing that the subcontractors' work should be considered part of "aban­
donment" because federal regulations require the removal of a 
platform after well depletion. The lessee also argued that a subcon­
tractor that performed sonic surveys of the site had not performed 
work "at the well site." The court disagreed, stating that LOWLA 
does not restrict "at the well site" to the immediate vicinity of the 
well. 
B. Uniform Cancellation Affidavit 
Act 124 of the Louisiana legislature's 2011 Regular Session enacted 
Louisiana Revised Statute 9:5166, which establishes the form for a 
uniform cancellation affidavit that may be used for the cancellation of 
mortgages and vendor's lien inscriptions, except for judicial and legal 
mortgages.70 Act 124 does not prohibit the use of any other method 
or form of cancellation otherwise authorized by law. 
VI. CONTAMINATION CLAIMS 
The Marins and the Breauxs brought tort and contract claims 
against the defendants, alleging that the defendants' oilfield activities 
had contaminated the plaintiffs' land.71 The trial court awarded ap­
proximately $21 million in compensatory damages, and an equal 
amount of punitive damages under former Civil Code article 2315.3.72 
The First Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed, and the Louisiana Su­
preme Court granted writs. One of the major issues in the case was 
whether the plaintiffs had asserted their claims timely. 
Under Louisiana law, claims are subject to liberative prescription, 
which is defined as "a mode of barring of actions as a result of inac-
65. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:4861-4873 (2007). 
66. See 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356a (2006). 
67. Cutting, 2011 WL 1103679 at *l. 
68. §§ 9:4861-4873. 
69. Cutting, 2011 WL 1103679 at *2. 
70. S.B. 24, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess., 2011 La. Acts 124. 
71. Marin v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 48 So. 3d 234, 241 (La. 2010). 
7�. Id. at 243. Former article 2315.3 allowed for the award of punitive damages in 
certain circumstances for activities involving hazardous substan ces. 
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tion for a period of time. "73 Although the Civil Code states that 
"[p]rescription runs against all person unless exception is established 
by legislation,"74 Louisiana jurisprudence recognizes that the running 
of prescription may be suspended by the doctrine of contra non 
valentem.75 Under this doctrine, the running of prescription is sus­
pended in certain circumstances, including if plaintiffs neirher knew 
nor reasonably should have known of their claim.76 In Marin, the 
lower courts concluded that the running of prescription had been sus­
pended by this "discovery rule" portion of the contra non valentem 
doctrine, and therefore, the plaintiffs' claims had not prescribed. 
The Supreme Court held, however, that the lower courts had erred 
in concluding that contra non valentem had interrupted the running of 
liberative prescription. For several years before filing suit, the plain­
tiffs had known that sugar cane would not grow near pits operated by 
the defendants. Further the plaintiffs had complained about contami­
nation for several years. This demonstrated sufficient knowledge to 
start the running of prescription. The Court rejected plaintiffs' argu­
ment that prescription did not start running until an environmental 
consultant informed them about the extent of contamination. Fur­
ther, although a defendant allegedly misled the plaintiffs about certain 
test results, the plaintiffs knew there was a problem and they could 
have investigated further. 
Next, the Court held that the evidence did not demonstrate a con­
tinuing tort. It had been several years since the defendants had depos­
ited wastes in the pits, and there was "scant" evidence that the pits 
were still leaking. And even if a plume of contaminants that already 
had leaked were still migrating beneath plaintiffs' property, the migra­
tion did not constitute a continuing tort. Therefore, the plaintiffs' tort 
claims were prescribed. 77 This required reversal of the punitive dam­
ages award because article 2315.3 punitive damages are a tort 
remedy.78 
Turning to the contract claims, the Court noted that the Breauxs 
were successors to a mineral lease that expired more than ten years 
before suit was filed. Therefore, their contract claims were pre­
scribed. 79 The Marins, on the other hand, still had a valid lease. The 
defendants argued that their contractual liability to clean up the 
Marins' property would not arise until after the lease expired, and that 
7
�. See LA. C1v. CODE ANN. art. 3447 (2007) (periods of liberative prescription 
are similar to statutes of limitations). 
74. See id. art. 3467. 
75. Marin, 48 So. 3d at 245. 
76. Id. 
. 77 . . See LA. �Iv: CODE ANN. art. 3492 (2008) (tort claims are subject to a one-year hberat1ve prescnpt1ve). 
78. Marin, 48 So. 3d at 256. 
79. Id. (contract claims are subject to a ten-year liberative prescription); see LA. 
C1v1L CoDE ANN. art. 3499 (2011). 
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the Marins' contract claims therefore were premature. The court dis­
agreed. Although a lessee's Civil Code article 2683 duty to return the 
leased thing to the lessor in the original condition, but for "normal 
wear and tear," does not arise until the end of the lease., other Civil 
Code and Mineral Code articles impose duties not to damage the 
leased premises, and claims based on those duties were not prema­
ture. Accordingly, the court upheld the Marins' compensatory dam­
ages award. 
Ironically, the court's dismissal of all the Breauxs' claims based on 
prescription meant that the court never reached one of the questions 
that had prompted it to grant writs-namely, whether purchasers of 
property have a right to sue for contamination that existed prior to 
their purchase. 80 This question arose because the contamination of 
the Breauxs' land occurred prior to their purchase of it .. 
VII. MANDATORY DISCLOSURE OF FRACTURING 
WATER COMPOSITION 
The Louisiana Department of Natural Resources ("DNR") pro­
posed a new regulation that would require operators to disclose infor­
mation about the water used in hydraulic fracturing.81 Specifically, 
the regulation would require operators to disclose: 
• the volume of hydraulic fracturing fluid used 
• the types of additives used (for example, biocides, corrosion in­
hibitors, friction reducers, etc.), as well as the volume of each type 
• the trade name and supplier of each additive, and 
• a list of the chemical compounds classified as hazaradous by the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration that are con­
tained in the additives, along with the maximum concentration of 
each compound.82 
If the identity of the chemical compound is a trade secret, the opera­
tor would be excused from identifying the compound, but would be 
required to identify the chemical family to which the compound 
belongs.83 
DNR collected public comments via e-mail and regular mail, and 
held a public meeting on the proposed regulation on August 30, 
80. See Marin, 48 So. 3d at 256. 
81. Hydraulic Fracture Stimulation Operations Hearing, DEP'T OF NATURAL REs., 
STATE OF LA., (Aug. 30, 2011) , http://dnr.louisiana.gov/index.cfm?md=calendar& 
tmp=detail&eid= 110&nid=249&pnid=231. 
82. See id. 
83. See id. 
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2011. 84 As of that time, the regulation appeared to be on track to 
become effective in late October 2011. 85 
84. Keith B. Hall, Louisiana's Proposed Regulation for Disclosure of Fracking 
Water Composition Appears on Track for Enactment, OIL & GAs L. BRIEF (Sept. 4, 
2011), http://www.oilgaslawbrief.com/hydraulic-fracturing/louisianas-proposed-regula­
tion-for-disclosure-of-fracking-water-composition-appears-on-track-for-ena/. 
85. Id. 
